


The Two Clubs: Major Global Powers and Status Considerations in International Politics.



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A Variety of Status Clubs In International Politics

Qualifying for Major Power Club Membership:

A state achieves membership in the *major power* club if it has

a) the *opportunity* to act as one through **unusual capabilities** with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations;

b) demonstrates its **willingness** to act as one by using those capabilities to pursue **unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its own region** and seeks to influence the course of international affairs *relatively independent of other major powers*; and

c) is **attributed** an unusual amount of *status* by policy makers of other states within the international community.


Status Differentiation within the Club

- **Status Consistent Major Powers:** states with high levels of status attribution consistent with their capabilities and demonstrated willingness to act.
 - **Status Overachievers:** states with full status attribution but with mixed capabilities and/or willingness to act as major powers.
- and
- **Status Underachievers:** states with substantial capabilities and willingness to act as major powers but with limited status attribution

Logit Models of Major Power Status and MID Joining, 1950—2001.*

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
All Major Powers	.83*** (.231)		
Status Consistent Major Powers		1.34*** (.332)	1.34*** (.333)
Status Inconsistent Major Powers		.59** (.200)	
Status Overachievers			.61 (.340)
Status Underachievers			.58*** (.224)
* Other control variables, including contiguity, regime type, peace years, and GDP/capita are not shown			
In (Capabilities)	.33*** (.048)	.32*** (.048)	.32*** (.048)
Constant	1.33*** (.369)	1.25*** (.372)	1.25*** (.375)
N	6,441	6,441	6,441
Chi 2	493.88***	732.81***	770.96***

New Post-Cold War FIGO Creation with Major Power Status Type as Founding Member, 1990-2007.



A Comparison of Threshold Entry Requirements for Brazil and India, Compared with New Major Powers, 2000-2007.

STATE	Capabilities		Foreign Policy*		Status**		Consistency***	
	GDP	EcReach	MilSp	MilReach	Coop	Conflict	Dipcon	Visits
<i>Brazil</i>	+							NIC
<i>India</i>	+				(*)		+	NIC
<i>China</i>	+	+			+	(*)	+	+ SIO
<i>Japan</i>	+	+		+	+		+	SIU
<i>Germany</i>	+	+			(*)	(*)	+	NIC****

-
- * The asterisk indicates that threshold is met or surpassed but not for extra-regional interactions.
 - ** Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states.
 - *** SC = Status consistent; SIO = Status overachiever; SIU = Status underachiever; NIC = not in club.
 - **** As Appendix A notes, Germany qualified as a member of the club only during one of the three post-Cold War timeframes, and in this period (2000-2007), it slips out as its foreign policy activity is primarily within its region.

Forecasting Assumptions (5)

- 1) The pursuit of status, including major power status, **does not have to be a zero sum game**, depending on the type of status pursuit strategy being pursued by the state in question, and how acceptant major powers are to increasing club membership to those with social mobility or social creativity strategies;
- 2) Entrance into the club typically follows a **linear pattern** of increased capabilities and increased engagement with regional and global orders. Huge, systemic disturbances have at times upset these linear changes, but more so to reduce, rather than increase membership;
- 3) **States have choices** to upgrade their capabilities and performance on the world stage by **increasing their political extraction capacity** endogenously; however, they are likely operating within a **given range** that is determined in part by the nature of their regimes, and by historical patterns of maximum and minimum performance.

Forecasting Assumptions (5)

4) **Major powers also have choices about allowing entry into the club:** whether or not they wish to constrain access to the club, or to facilitate it under certain conditions.

5) Both Brazil and India **will retain their foreign policy independence** relative to the U.S. while pursuing their membership into the club of major powers.

Projections for Brazil and India, Baseline/Status Quo Scenario (1).

				BRAZIL					Status Position
		Capabilities			Activity		Status		
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+				+		NIC
2036-40			+				+		NIC
2041-45			+				+		NIC
2046-50			+				+		NIC
				INDIA					
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+				+	+	NIC
2026-30			+				+	+	NIC
2031-35			+				+	+	NIC
2036-40			+				+	+	NIC
2041-45			+				+	+	NIC
2046-50	+		+				+	+	SIO

Projections for Brazil and India, Status Quo Accelerated Scenario (2).

				BRAZIL					Status Position	
		Capabilities			Activity		Status			
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits		
2010-15			+						NIC	
2016-20			+						NIC	
2021-25			+						NIC	
2026-30			+						NIC	
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC	
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC	
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC	
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC	
				INDIA						NIC
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC	
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC	
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2041-45	+		+	+	+		+	+	SIO	
2046-50	+		+	+	+		+	+	SIO	

Projections for Brazil and India, Minimally Contested Accelerated Scenario (3).

				BRAZIL					Status Position
		Capabilities			Activity		Status		
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC
				INDIA					NIC
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC
2041-45			+	+			+	+	NIC
2046-50			+	+			+	+	NIC

Conclusions and Consequences

- The increase in number of major powers, and/or the loss of status on one or more of the existing major powers, may change the dynamics of status competition
- More major powers may lead to more status competition
- But it also matters whether new members join the major power club as status consistent or inconsistent
- India and, to a lesser extent, Brazil see themselves as major power states already although they are lacking on some dimensions
- Existing major powers face the policy puzzle of whether granting them early access or resisting their entry
- India's and Brazil's own ability to find and enact "creative" strategies for status pursuit will affect when and how they will join the major power club
- Exits from the club: ?????