

Which States Are Next: Seeking Entrance to the Club of Major Powers.

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
Our Objectives

- Explore the salience of major power status in international politics:
 - especially status seeking, status attribution and status competition for conflict and cooperation dynamics

In this effort: to try to predict when/ if the strongest of regional powers are likely to join the major power club...and under what circumstances.

Literature

- Long History
 - Cyclical
 - Empirically persistent (control variable)
 - Reemerging after Cold War
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- Major distinctions across theoretical perspectives (structuralists/liberals/constructivists)
 - Major distinctions across disciplines: sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists



A Variety of Status Clubs In International Politics



Our Approach

- **Integrate** realist and constructivist perspectives;
- **Differentiate** between different types of major power status;
- **Develop empirical status attribution measures** that are capable of disaggregating between types of major power status;
- Apply to the **changing nature of the club** and the consequences for international politics.

Mechanisms of Major Power Status Attribution

Opportunity


Military Strength
Military Reach
Economic Size
Economic Reach



Status
Attribution

Willingness

Active global engagement
in conflict and cooperation



Constraints

- major power independence
- lead power influence on norms

Qualifying for Major Power Club Membership:

A state achieves membership in the *major power* club if it has

a) the *opportunity* to act as one through **unusual capabilities** with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations;

b) demonstrates its **willingness** to act as one by using those capabilities to pursue **unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its own region** and seeks to influence the course of international affairs *relatively independent of other major powers*; and

c) is **attributed** an unusual amount of *status* by policy makers of other states within the international community.

Status Differentiation within the Club

- **Status Consistent (SC) Major Powers:** states with high levels of status attribution consistent with their capabilities and demonstrated willingness to act.
- **Status Overachievers (SO):** states with full status attribution but with mixed capabilities and/or willingness to act as major powers.

and

- **Status Underachievers (SU):** states with substantial capabilities and willingness to act as major powers but with limited status attribution

Q: Why Does Differentiation in Major Power Status Matter?

A: Overachievers and Underachievers act differently toward international politics in terms of cooperation and conflict dynamics.

They also differ from status consistent major powers in terms of conflict and cooperation dynamics.

RE CONFLICT INVOLVEMENT:

Major Power Status and MID Joining, 1950-2001.

Percent of years State
Joins a MID*

Non-Major Power Status State**	3%

Major Power Status State	31%

Status Consistent Major Power State	43%
Status Underachiever Major Power	48%
Status Overachiever Major Power	10%

* = Number of states x number of years.


** = for “politically relevant” states

Logit Models of Major Power Status and MID Joining, 1950—2001.*

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
All Major Powers	.83*** (.231)		
Status Consistent Major Powers		1.34*** (.332)	1.34*** (.333)
Status Inconsistent Major Powers		.59** (.200)	
Status Overachievers			.61 (.340)
Status Underachievers			.58*** (.224)
* Other control variables, including contiguity, regime type, peace years, and GDP/capita are not shown			
In (Capabilities)	.33*** (.048)	.32*** (.048)	.32*** (.048)
Constant	1.33*** (.369)	1.25*** (.372)	1.25*** (.375)
N	6,441	6,441	6,441
Chi 2	493.88***	732.81***	770.96***

RE COOPERATION DYNAMICS:

Founding Members of New FIGOs Created, by Major Power Status Type, for all FIGOs, 1989-2008.



NEW CLUB MEMBERS?

A Comparison of Threshold Entry Requirements for Brazil and India, Compared with New Major Powers, 2000-2010.

STATE	Capabilities		Foreign Policy*		Status**		Consistency***		
	GDP	EcReach	MilSp	MilReach	Coop	Conflict	Dipcon	Visits	
<i>Brazil</i>	+							NIC	
<i>India</i>	+				(*)		+	NIC	
<i>China</i>	+	+			+	(*)	+	+	SO
<i>Japan</i>	+	+		+	+		+		SU
<i>Germany</i>	+	+			(*)	(*)	+		NIC****

- * The asterisk indicates that threshold is met or surpassed but not for extra-regional interactions.
- ** Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states.
- *** SC = Status consistent; SO = Status overachiever; SU = Status underachiever; NIC = not in club.
- **** As Appendix A notes, Germany qualified as a member of the club only during one of the three post-Cold War timeframes, and in this period (2000-2010), it slips out as its foreign policy activity is primarily within its region.

Forecasting Assumptions (5)

- 1) The pursuit of status, including major power status, **does not have to be a zero sum game**, depending on the type of status pursuit strategy being pursued by the state in question, and how acceptant major powers are to increasing club membership to those with social mobility or social creativity strategies;
- 2) Entrance into the club typically follows a **linear pattern** of increased capabilities and increased engagement with regional and global orders. Huge, systemic disturbances have at times upset these linear changes, but more so to reduce, rather than increase membership;
- 3) **States have choices** to upgrade their capabilities and performance on the world stage by **increasing their political extraction capacity** endogenously; however, they are likely operating within a **given range** that is determined in part by the nature of their regimes, and by historical patterns of maximum and minimum performance.

Forecasting Assumptions (5)

4) **Major powers also have choices about allowing entry into the club:** whether or not they wish to constrain access to the club, or to facilitate it under certain conditions.

5) Brazil and India **will retain their foreign policy independence** relative to the U.S. while pursuing their membership into the club of major powers.

Projections for Brazil and India, Baseline/Status Quo Scenario (1).

				BRAZIL					Status Position
		Capabilities			Activity		Status		
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+				+		NIC
2036-40			+				+		NIC
2041-45			+				+		NIC
2046-50			+				+		NIC
				INDIA					
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+				+	+	NIC
2026-30			+				+	+	NIC
2031-35			+				+	+	NIC
2036-40			+				+	+	NIC
2041-45			+				+	+	NIC
2046-50	+		+				+	+	SO

Projections for Brazil and India, Status Quo Accelerated Scenario (2).

				BRAZIL					Status Position	
		Capabilities			Activity		Status			
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits		
2010-15			+						NIC	
2016-20			+						NIC	
2021-25			+						NIC	
2026-30			+						NIC	
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC	
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC	
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC	
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC	
				INDIA						NIC
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC	
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC	
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC	
2041-45	+		+	+	+		+	+	SO	
2046-50	+		+	+	+		+	+	SO	

Projections for Brazil and India, Minimally Contested Accelerated Scenario (3).

				BRAZIL					Status Position
		Capabilities			Activity		Status		
Time	Milex	Milreach	GDP	EcReach	Coop	Conf	Dipcon	Visits	
2010-15			+						NIC
2016-20			+						NIC
2021-25			+						NIC
2026-30			+						NIC
2031-35			+	+			+		NIC
2036-40			+	+			+		NIC
2041-45			+	+			+		NIC
2046-50			+	+			+		NIC
				INDIA					NIC
2010-15			+				+	+	NIC
2016-20			+				+	+	NIC
2021-25			+	+			+	+	NIC
2026-30			+	+			+	+	NIC
2031-35			+	+			+	+	NIC
2036-40			+	+			+	+	NIC
2041-45			+	+			+	+	NIC
2046-50			+	+			+	+	NIC

Conclusions and Consequences

- The dynamics of status competition and status conflict depends in large part about whether new members join the club as underachievers or overachievers.
- India and Brazil already see themselves as major power states, although they are not likely to enter the club in the near future. Their abilities to find an enact “creative” strategies for status recognition may determine if they will ever join the club and their dissatisfaction with the status quo,

while
- Existing major powers face the policy puzzle of helping to grant them early access or to resist their entry.
- Also need to consider the consequences of states exiting the club (Japan?; Germany?; Russia?)