

The Iraq Coalition of the Willing *and* (Politically) Able: Party Systems, the Press, and Public Influence on Foreign Policy

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Media outlets in multiparty electoral systems tend to report on a wider range of policy issues than media in two-party systems. They thus make more competing policy frames available to citizens. This suggests that a “free press” is insufficient to hold governments accountable. Rather, we should observe more challenges to the governments’ preferred frames and more politically aware citizens in multiparty democracies. Such citizens should thus be better equipped to hold their leaders accountable, relative to their counterparts in two-party democracies. I propose a mechanism through which democratic publics can sometimes constrain their leaders in foreign policy. I test hypotheses derived from my theory with cross-national data on the content of news coverage of Iraq, on public support for the war, and on decisions to contribute troops to the Iraq “Coalition of the Willing.” I find that citizens in countries with larger numbers of parties confronted more critical and diverse coverage of Iraq, while those with more widespread access to mass media were more likely to oppose the war and their nations likely to contribute fewer troops to the Coalition.

Scholars have long recognized the importance of information in mediating interactions between states. Theories of international conflict, in particular, turn on questions of the transparency, reliability, and availability of information to the actors involved in disputes (e.g., Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothschild 1996). Yet political scientists have devoted scant attention to the process by which states disseminate information among and between themselves. In effect, most international relations research assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that information passes efficiently from leaders’ mouths or actions to the intended recipients. If so, the only remaining uncertainty—which underpins much of the formal conflict literature—concerns what information a leader transmits or withholds and whether or not the intended recipient(s) view(s) it as reliable. In an era dominated by mass democracies, this assumption seems problematic.

Throughout the post-WWII era, democratic citizens have primarily learned about their governments’ activities

via the mass media. This raises the questions of whether and how the media influence states’ behavior in international conflicts. The few scholars of international relations who have investigated this question (Choi and James 2006; Slantchev 2006; Van Belle 2000) have mostly emphasized the possibility that a free press might facilitate peaceful conflict resolution by raising the domestic political costs to leaders of engaging in war abroad.

Communication scholars (Jakobsen 2000; Mermin 1999; Wolfsfeld 2004) and journalists (Sharkey 1993; Strobel 1997) have shown greater interest in this question. However, this literature emphasizes the propensity of media to *exacerbate* military conflicts, either by pressuring democratic leaders to use military force for humanitarian purposes (Mermin 1999; Sharkey 1993; Strobel 1997) or by undermining peace negotiations (Wolfsfeld 2004).

I argue that media influence can cut both ways and that a free press is insufficient for media to constrain democratic leaders in foreign policy.¹ Rather, the key

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¹Replication data are available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/cotw.html>.

factors in determining whether the media will inhibit, embolden, or fail to influence democratic leaders are their propensity to challenge the government's preferred framing of the policy and the public's likelihood of hearing such a challenge. In this study, I develop and test a theory intended to delineate circumstances under which media influence is more or less likely.

I focus on two factors that influence the effects of media on public opinion and of media and public opinion on foreign policy: (1) the extent of public access to mass media and (2) the nature of a state's party system. In the latter case, research (Benson 2009; Milner 2002; Moosbrugger n.d.; Schmitt-Beck 2003) has shown that multiparty electoral systems engender more diverse and policy-oriented media coverage of politics, and consequently better-informed citizens, relative to two-party systems (Kumlin 2001; Swanson and Mancini 1996). Hence, citizens in multiparty systems are more likely to be skeptical of a leader's foreign policy. All else equal, this should reduce leaders' willingness to accept the risky gamble of a war. In the former case, citizens of different nations vary widely in their access to the mass media and hence to information about their leaders' activities abroad. Absent sufficient access, citizens are relatively unlikely to receive any messages a leader might send and hence are unable to assess such messages or the policies to which they refer in order to hold a leader accountable.

The Bush administration employed a variety of economic and military carrots and sticks to persuade reluctant foreign leaders to join the Iraq "Coalition of the Willing" (hereafter "the Coalition"). For many world leaders, whose populations overwhelmingly opposed the war, the decision to join the Coalition was a fraught one. In some other countries, where opposition was less extreme, public support was at best shallow, leaving little doubt that it could quickly erode if things went badly. Yet, because of America's status as the world's most powerful nation, many states saw strategic advantages to joining the Coalition. This conflict between *domestic political* and *international strategic* incentives makes Iraq an ideal case for investigating the conditions under which public opinion constrains foreign policy.

I begin by explicating my theory. I then investigate the relationship between party systems and news coverage, employing a unique content-analysis dataset spanning 43 democracies during the period surrounding the start of the Iraq War. I next test my opinion and decision-making hypotheses through both OLS and recursive regression analyses, employing data on public war support (62 countries) and troop commitments (180 countries) to the Coalition. The final section concludes.

Mass Media, Electoral Institutions, and Public Opinion

Access to Information. Research (Choi and James 2006; Van Belle 2000) has shown that mutual free presses reduce the likelihood of military conflict between pairs of democracies because having relatively credible information sources on both sides raises the expected domestic political risks to leaders of going to war. However, such research has not considered the implications of either variation in the capacity of democratic citizens to *receive* information transmitted via the media or of differences in democratic institutions for the *content* of news and hence for the capacity of citizens to gain the information they need to hold their leaders accountable. If citizens lack access to the media, if the media fail to offer much policy-relevant information, or if the public perceives them as a government propaganda tool, then citizens may lack sufficient credible information to assess their leader's foreign policy activities, especially early in a conflict.

Hence, a free press is not a *sufficient* condition for citizens to hold their leaders accountable. Leaders can rally their domestic populations to support their policies, or be held accountable for their failures, only if the public hears what they or their opponents are saying and believes it. In contemporary mass democracies, in turn, the mass media are typically leaders' primary vehicles for communicating to citizens. This means that, all else equal, in countries where large proportions of the public have ready access to the press, citizens are more likely to be listening when their leaders call. Such leaders are thus better situated to rally public support. Yet they also face greater potential risks from acting contrary to the preferences of their citizens, especially if they face an adversarial press likely to challenge their preferred foreign policy frame. Public access to reliable political information via the media is therefore a potentially critical factor mediating leaders' risk propensities in foreign policy.

Press Freedom and Democratic Constraint. Even if the government does not officially control the media, they may not always operate as watchdogs of government. Institutionally free presses in democracies sometimes function as largely uncritical conduits of leaders' foreign policy messages. This calls into at least some question the prevalence of a truly unbiased media that provides credible, policy-relevant information to citizens (Choi and James 2006; Slantchev 2006).

For instance, research (e.g., Bennett 1990; Cook 1994; Entman 2003; Zaller and Chiu 2000) has shown that U.S.

news content, especially in times of war, tends to be indexed to the tenor of elite debate. Since in foreign affairs the president is the most authoritative and hence newsworthy of all elites, he wields disproportionate influence over the content of news about foreign affairs (Cook 1994; Groeling and Baum 2008). Indeed, if news coverage is indexed to the leader's rhetoric, it seems likely to rally public support for the policy. Perceptions of low media credibility may mitigate this rally effect somewhat, but absent similarly prominent credible signals of opposition, it seems unlikely to undermine it altogether (Brody 1991).

Entman (2003) argues that indexing is most likely when an issue involves frames that are salient to the culture and consonant with dominant cultural norms, such as anticommunism during the Cold War. Such frames are widely shared and deeply held by large portions of the citizenry. Challenging a culturally resonant frame is difficult, as typical individuals are biased toward accepting information that reinforces rather than challenges their core beliefs (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992). In such circumstances, the media tend to accept the dominant frame, typically emanating from the government, rather than "running uphill" by contesting it. For instance, Zaller and Chiu (2000) find that American media coverage of post-World War II U.S. uses of force was more closely indexed to the government when the conflict involved anticommunism than in other instances.

Conversely, when an issue involves contested cultural norms—such as the moral value of alleviating suffering through humanitarian intervention, weighed against the risk of casualties in a conflict lacking clear national security interests—this leaves an opening for the media to challenge the government's preferred frame. In such circumstances, the media may independently influence citizens' interpretations of a leader's foreign policy actions (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingstone 2006; Entman 2003). This suggests that factors other than institutional independence from government shape the content of information contained in the press.

Electoral Institutions, Political Sophistication, and Foreign Policy Frames

Recent research into the relationship between institutional forms of democracy, media diversity, and citizens' political knowledge (Iyengar et al. 2010; Kumlin 2001; Milner 2002; Moosbrugger n.d.; Schmitt-Beck 2003; van der Eijk et al. 1999) suggests democracies and their media organizations vary in the quality of information they provide to citizens. Most, though not all, democracies have institutionally free presses (Van Belle 2000). Yet this generalization misses a great deal of variation among

democracies. Most notably for my purposes, media outlets in multiparty electoral systems tend to report on a wider range of policy issues and to do so in greater depth than their counterparts in two-party systems (Benson 2009; Moosbrugger n.d.). They also tend to offer less personality-centric coverage of politics (Moosbrugger n.d.; Stromback and Dimitrova 2006) and more mainstream coverage of ideologically diverse and oppositional viewpoints (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2009). In other words, distinct from the extent of press freedom, multiparty systems are associated with more diverse and higher-quality political information—with quality defined as "information voters can use to inform party choices across contests (local, state, and federal) and across time" (Moosbrugger n.d., 13)—and hence more politically sophisticated electorates than two-party systems (Bennett 1995; Kumlin 2001; Milner 2002; Schmitt-Beck 2003).

Downs shows, via a spatial model, that as the number of parties increases, each party must compete over a smaller ideological space and do so through more concrete policy positions. Conversely, in two-party systems, parties have an incentive to offer more vague policy stances in order to appeal to the median voter. He thus observes:

[V]oters in multiparty systems are much more likely to be swayed by doctrinal considerations—matters of ideology and policy—than are voters in two-party systems. The latter voters are massed in the moderate range where both ideologies lie; hence they are likely to view personality, or technical competence, or some other nonideological factor as decisive. . . Voters in multiparty systems, however, are given a wide range of ideological choice, with parties emphasizing rather than soft-pedaling their doctrinal differences. (1957, 126–27)

Consequently, media in multiparty democracies are more likely to have access to, and hence to make available to citizens, competing frames—including alternatives to the government's preferred frame (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2009)—when leaders engage in foreign conflicts.² This suggests that media coverage in multiparty

²The prevailing view in literature (e.g., Cox 1990; Dow 2001) supports the Downsian notion of a positive relationship between the number of parties and the tendency for such parties to "emphasize doctrinal differences." However, see Ezrow (2008) for a potentially contrary view, albeit based on a far smaller sample than that employed in this study (18 advanced democracies during the 1980s). Ezrow reports that parties in PR systems, and in systems with larger numbers of parties, do not appear to hold more extreme ideological positions.

democracies—which tend to employ proportional representation (PR) electoral rules—is likely to be more *functionally* independent from government than in two-party democracies. The empirical implication is that as the number of electoral parties in a state increases, we should observe relatively more policy-oriented and less personality/human interest-oriented news coverage, as well as less support for government policy and a wider range of frames pertaining to a given policy appearing in the news.³ More diversity in frames by definition implies more alternatives to the government's preferred frame, and hence less support for it. I term this the Downsian Political Information Hypothesis (H_D), which I empirically test below.

Higher-quality political information from the media, in turn, makes citizens in multiparty democracies more politically sophisticated and better able to recognize and make use of ideological cues than their counterparts in two-party democracies.⁴ Hence, the former citizens are, all else equal, better able to incorporate new information into their belief systems (Gordon and Segura 1997; Kumlin 2001). They are thus likely to be better equipped to hold their leaders accountable relative to their less sophisticated counterparts in two-party democracies.

Additional research (Druckman 2004) has shown that the effects of a frame on an individual are strongest absent a competing counterframe. Because citizens in multiparty democracies tend to be exposed to multiple policy frames more than their counterparts in two-party democracies, they are less likely to accept the government's preferred frame. Since leaders nearly (if not literally) always support their own policies, such alternative frames will tend to challenge the wisdom of the government's policy. This reduces citizens' propensities to rally behind leaders in times of crisis. Hence, leaders of multiparty democracies ought, all else equal, to be more concerned than their counterparts in two-party democracies with the prospect of public scrutiny of their actions. Several hypotheses concerning the Iraq Coalition follow:

H1: As the number of parties increases, greater public access to the media will be associated with reduced public support for the Iraq War, all else equal.

³Greater diversity of frames across media outlets does not, however, necessarily imply any particular degree of ideological balance within or across media outlets in a given country.

⁴Iyengar et al. (2010) report that exposure to public broadcasting also raises citizens' political knowledge in different democracies. Party systems may influence the robustness of public broadcasting in ways consistent with the Downsian hypothesis. However, because they only looked at four countries, I cannot employ their data to systematically investigate this possibility.

H2: As the number of parties decreases, all else equal, the relationship between public access to the media and public support for the war will weaken, and may ultimately reverse, with increased media access associated with greater support for the war.

When Can Citizens Deter Their Leaders? War is risky. Democratic leaders who lose military conflicts pay a substantial political price at home, sometimes including removal from office (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Smith 1996). Indeed, the domestic political risks associated with foreign policy failure tend to exceed the potential benefit given success (Baum 2004). Democratic leaders—especially in multiparty democracies where the potential costs are relatively high—thus typically have more to lose than to gain by engaging in risky foreign conflicts.

Citizens, in turn, are likely to punish their leader less severely for acting contrary to their preferences if they are *inattentive* than if they are highly engaged, all else equal (Baum 2004). After all, opposition party criticism is more likely to resonate if the public is listening. Consequently, leaders will be more inclined to risk military force without significant public support *in the absence of* public scrutiny. Since the media are the public's primary information source, this implies that greater public access to mass media—especially in multiparty democracies where media are more likely to feature challenges to the policy—is likely to be associated with more risk-averse foreign policy behavior by democratic leaders. Several hypotheses follow.

H3: As the number of parties increases, greater public access to the media will be associated with a reduced likelihood of sending troops to participate in the Coalition, all else equal.

H4: As the number of parties decreases, all else equal, the relationship between public access to the media and participation in the Coalition will weaken, and may ultimately reverse, with increased media access associated with a greater likelihood of sending troops.

It is certainly possible that citizens might support a war more than their government and hence perhaps pressure a leader to enter a conflict and punish her politically if she fails to do so. If so, all else equal, greater media access and more parties might *raise*, rather than lower, the likelihood of going to war. However, if one assumes that, all else equal, using military force typically attracts greater public attention than *not* doing so, then it follows from my prior assumptions regarding the relative costs versus benefits of war that a leader's preferences regarding

public scrutiny, and the relatively greater likelihood of public scrutiny in multiparty democracies, are likely to be the exception, rather than the rule.⁵

To varying degrees, leaders interpret variations in contemporaneous public support for an issue as evidence of the likely strength of potential support over the longer term. Election-minded leaders are frequently more responsive to anticipated *future* public opinion than to contemporaneous opinion (Rosenau 1961; Zaller 1994). The closer the link between the two, the stronger will be the influence of the latter on a leader's decision making. This link in turn is likely to be tightest in multiparty systems, where citizens tend to be more politically sophisticated and leaders more immediately and directly accountable for their policy performance. A final hypothesis follows:


H5: Governments' decisions regarding committing troops to the Coalition will correspond more closely with public opinion regarding the Iraq War as media access and the number of parties increase, all else equal.

Of course, consensual systems are designed to be more responsive than majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1999). In multiparty systems, leaders frequently face the possibility of a no-confidence vote in the legislature and the resulting loss of power. A foreign policy failure presumably increases the likelihood of such an occurrence, particularly if the executive sits atop a coalition. Consequently, leaders in multiparty systems may be more concerned about public opinion irrespective of the information environment. If so, the number of parties may be the true factor driving all of these relationships. This implies that variations in media access should not mediate the influence of public opinion. It further suggests that the *direction* of any effects of media access should be consistent across party systems. Conversely, my theory predicts that both the magnitude and direction of media effects will differ qualitatively across multi- and two-party systems.

Figure 1 summarizes my causal argument. The influence of each causal variable can be *ex ante* (indicated by dotted lines) via the leader's *expectations* concerning the likely influence of each variable on the political costs and benefits associated with the policy. This depends in part on expectations regarding news coverage, which the party system influences. It also depends on the likelihood that the public will receive the media's messages

⁵For instance, an average of 56% of respondents across 19 and 63 countries, respectively, for whom I have survey data, *opposed* the multinational interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001 (excluding the United States and United Kingdom, these figures rise to nearly 60% in each case).

FIGURE 1 Illustration of Processes by Which Media Access, Party Systems, and News Coverage Influence Foreign Policy Decision Making



and that it will ultimately support the policy, as well as on the leader's political vulnerability, which the party system also helps determine. It can also be *ex post* (indicated by solid lines) via the leader's responses to *actual expressed* public opinion, itself directly influenced by news content, which again the party system influences, and public access to that content.

Data and Methodology

I begin by briefly describing the automated cross-national media content-analysis data I employed to test the Downsian Political Information Hypothesis (H_D). My data include all newspaper articles (311,921 in total) available through the LexisNexis and ISI Emerging Markets database for democratic countries that included the word "Iraq" between December 20, 2002, and April 28, 2003.⁶ The data cover 43 countries and include 497 newspapers ($\mu = 13$ papers per country).⁷ I have party data for 35 of the 43 cases.⁸ I coded all articles on a variety of dimensions, including valence with respect to government policy (positive, negative, neutral), focus (personalities, human interest, military, or policy-oriented), and

⁶"Democratic countries" are those that score 6 or higher on the Polity IV "DEMOC-AUTOC" scale.

⁷Comparable multicountry TV transcripts were inaccessible. Since the criterion for inclusion in these databases is unknown to me, this could potentially be an unrepresentative sample of newspapers, although there is no *ex ante* reason to anticipate that this should work in favor of my predictions.

⁸While this represents too few cases to allow a fully controlled analysis, I do nonetheless report results from basic regressions employing these data but excluding most control variables.

distinct topics covered (out of 17 possible topics) for all Iraq-related news stories (see the supplemental online appendix for a detailed description of the content analysis). To test Hypothesis 1 through Hypothesis 5, I collected data on domestic electoral institutions and TV penetration for 180 countries, as well as on public opinion regarding the Iraq War between mid-2002 and mid-2003 for 62 countries.

Case Selection. The Iraq War began on March 20, 2003. The decision by nations around the world to participate, or not, in the U.S.-led Coalition is an ideal case study for testing my theory. This was an unusually large-scale conflict involving large numbers of states. It was highly salient to citizens around the world, making it a potentially politically risky endeavor for leaders contemplating involvement. Focusing on a single conflict allows me to hold constant the conflict's circumstances and location, the characteristics of the primary protagonists and of the international environment, as well as numerous other factors that might influence states' decisions regarding whether or not to become involved.

An average of 67% of the public across 62 nations in my dataset expressed opposition to the Iraq War between mid-2002 and mid-2003. Yet 22 of these nations (over 35%) nonetheless sent troops to Iraq. The Bush administration listed 49 nations as members of the Coalition, five of which (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and Denmark) contributed military forces to the original invasion. Another 33 subsequently provided troops. According to GlobalSecurity.org, as of August 2006, 21 nations continued to maintain a troop presence in Iraq, although the composition of states with troops varied over time. My dataset includes 32 nations that contributed troops to the Coalition between 2003 and 2004.

I focus on the 2003–2004 period because this is when states made their primary decisions about becoming involved. States subsequently joined or left the Coalition for a variety of reasons. But the initial decision to participate or not represents the clearest decision point where domestic political circumstances could have influenced the decisions of leaders around the world. This was also the peak period of public awareness of the issue worldwide and hence the time where public opinion data are available for the maximum number of countries.

Dependent Variables. I employ two dependent variables. The first, *War Opposition*, represents the average percentage of respondents *opposing* the Iraq War across all available survey questions regarding support for the war conducted within a given country between April 2002 and

May 2003.⁹ This variable, derived from 13 multicountry surveys, ranges from 29.5 to 96%, with a mean and standard deviation of 66.9 and 1.56%, respectively. Because this variable is bounded between zero and one, I employ the natural logarithm in my regressions.

Four of the 13 surveys took place after the start of the war (in May 2003), and hence they may have *followed* rather than preceded the decisions of several nations to deploy troops. This raises the possibility of reverse causality. I believe the benefit of including these opinion observations outweighs the potential costs for several reasons. First, given the limited number of available observations, sacrificing all post-March data would severely restrict my ability to conduct a properly controlled analysis. Second, the exceptionally high salience of the prewar debate meant that public opinion had solidified in most nations well before the outbreak of war. In fact, there is only about a 1 percentage point difference in average levels of support expressed in surveys conducted prior to or following March 20, 2003. Consequently, it seems fairly unlikely that very many nations altered their decisions regarding participation in the Coalition as a consequence of the effects of the first month of the conflict on public attitudes in those nations.¹⁰

My second key causal variable is the maximum number of troops contributed to the Coalition by each state between the start of the war in March 2003 and March 2004.¹¹ Of the 62 states in my dataset with at least one public opinion survey in 2003, 22 contributed troops during this period. Excluding the 145,000 U.S. troops, such contributions ranged from a low of 25 by Kazakhstan to a high of 45,000 by the United Kingdom. The average number of troops contributed by those states that contributed more than zero (again, excluding the United States) is 1,807, with a standard deviation of 8,030. In order to further account for the varying capacities of states, I divided this total by each state's total population (in thousands), yielding per capita troop commitment. Among all states for whom opinion data are available in 2003, this indicator varies from zero to .76, with a mean

⁹See the online supplemental appendix for all surveys, questions, and countries employed in this indicator.

¹⁰I nonetheless replicated all of my models excluding the post-March 2003 cases. I also tested models excluding either the U.S. or U.K. cases. In each instance, the results (see Table A6 in the supplemental appendix) differ only modestly from those reported below.

¹¹Troop commitment levels are from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm and Perspectives on World History and Current Events (PWHCE, at <http://www.pwhce.org/willing.html>), as well as from a variety of supplemental sources.

of .31 and a standard deviation of .114 (or, excluding the United States, .024 and .098, respectively). Finally, among nations other than the United States that contributed, the mean per capita contribution level is .069, with a standard deviation of .160.

Independent Variables. I include two key causal variables and as many as eight controls in my fully specified models. The first key causal variable (*TV Access*) is the number of televisions in a given country per 1,000 population. I focus on TV for two reasons, one conceptual and one practical. Beginning with the latter, far more data are available on TV access than for any other type of media. Equally important, television is by far the most important form of media worldwide for presenting political information to mass audiences. It remains, in many nations, the ubiquitous appliance. For instance, according to a 2009 Pew Center survey of 25 countries—spanning nearly every region and level of development—an average of 72% of respondents named television as their primary source of news about national and international affairs. Newspapers came in second at less than 10%, while the Internet took fourth place, at 7.9%.¹² Access to the media, or television in particular, certainly does not guarantee that a citizen will be politically informed. However, I argue that it is at minimum an important contributing factor and arguably a necessary precursor.¹³

The second key causal variable measures the number of political parties within each state. I operationalize this variable three different ways. The first two, taken from Golder (2005), are the Effective Number of *Parliamentary* (ENPP) and *Electoral* (ENEP) Parties.¹⁴ These data are available for 51 of the 62 countries in my dataset for which I also have public opinion data (104 and 100 countries overall for ENPP and ENEP, respectively).

¹²The countries included Canada, United States, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Russia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, Turkey, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Kenya, and Nigeria.

¹³I tested all models with controls for levels and annual changes in Internet access. Since governments have less influence over Internet content relative to other media—even though Internet users have greater capacity to self-select into websites that reinforce their prior beliefs—I anticipated weaker results for the Internet variables. None proved significant. Hence, I exclude them from my final models.

¹⁴See Golder (2005) for the formulas for deriving ENPP and ENEP. In my data, ENPP varies from a low of 1.0 to a high of 9.05, with a mean and standard deviation of 3.29 and 1.56, respectively (3.97 and 1.61, respectively, among countries for which I have opinion data). ENEP varies from 1.59 to 10.29, with a mean and standard deviation of 4.05 and 1.78, respectively (4.80 and 1.86, respectively, among countries for which I also have public opinion data).

My third electoral system indicator is a dummy, coded one for proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, and zero for mixed, plurality, or majority-rule systems. These data are from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).¹⁵ The PR dummy has a mean of .39 and a standard deviation of .49 (or .63 and .49, respectively, for states with 2003 opinion data).

I consider ENPP, which captures the number of parties actually serving in the legislature, to be the best available measure of the domestic political environment pertinent to media actors seeking to frame their coverage to appeal to constituents. However, because this is an uncertain judgment, I replicate all models using both party measures, which correlate at about .86 (presumably because some parties fail to win sufficient numbers of votes to gain legislative seats). The PR dummy is the most indirect of the three measures. Nonetheless, since PR systems tend to produce larger numbers of parties than plurality systems, I employ it as a robustness check. This dummy is also available for far more states, thereby expanding the number of observations in my models. The actual number of cases varies from 49 to 172, depending on the mix of variables. The PR dummy correlates with ENPP and ENEP at .32 and .24, respectively.¹⁶ For my hypothesis tests, I interact TV access with my indicators of the number of parties and public opposition to the war.

For my data on democracy, I employ the Polity IV democracy score.¹⁷ Following convention, I subtract a state's score on the 10-point Polity autocracy scale from its score on the 10-point democracy scale (where 1 = min. and 10 = max., yielding a final scale running from -10 to 10).

To capture a state's capacity to contribute to the Coalition, I estimate each state's overall economic power and current economic performance, as well as its level of development. The macroeconomic indicators include 2003 per capita GDP and, to capture growth rates, the percent change in GDP from 2002 to 2003 (both in current U.S. dollars). I also include inflation, measured as the annual

¹⁵See <http://www.idea.int>. I employ data from January 2005 (the closest to 2003 available). To my knowledge (based on consultations with colleagues and more detailed checks of several uncertain cases), no state in my data changed its electoral system between 2003 and early 2005 sufficiently to change its coding from a zero to a one, or vice versa.

¹⁶The higher correlation between PR and ENPP makes sense, given that the latter variable measures the number of parties in the legislature, rather than in the society. Nearly all democracies have more than two parties. The most direct effect of electoral rules is to mediate their capacity to enter the legislature and hence their likelihood of gaining influence.

¹⁷Available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

percent change in average consumer prices from 2002 to 2003. To measure a state's level of economic development, I employ infant mortality rates (circa 2004) and secondary-school enrollment ratios (circa 2003).

I also include dummies for NATO members and for membership in *any* formal alliance with the United States, respectively. These dummies account for the possibility that alliance relationships, or the similar electoral institutions of most NATO member states, might systematically influence states' propensities to contribute troops to the Coalition.¹⁸

Lastly, press freedom might either directly influence conflict behavior or perhaps mediate the effects of information on public opinion and leaders' decision making. To estimate press freedom, I employ the Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) "World Press Freedom Ranking." In fact, once per capita GDP, media access, and the number of parties are accounted for, the coefficient on this indicator becomes small and insignificant in all model specifications.¹⁹ This may be attributable to the predominance of democratic, free-press states among those for which I have data on war opposition and the number of parties, which restricts the range of variation on the press-freedom indicator. Regardless, given my limited statistical leverage, I exclude it from the reported models.²⁰

Results

Testing the Downsian Political Information Hypothesis (H_D). I employ a series of t-tests to compare countries above and below the mean number of parties, based on the ENPP and ENEP indicators. First, I compare the volume of personality or human-interest-oriented coverage with

¹⁸I tested additional controls, including states' total and urban populations, energy use, material capabilities, military expenditures, military personnel, and trade relations with and arms transfers from the United States, as well as similarity to the United States of voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly. I also tested country and region-specific dummies. Though several variables approached significance, none altered the key relationships. To preserve statistical leverage, I exclude these model variations from my reported results.

¹⁹These data are based on a survey of "journalists, researchers, jurists, and human rights activists" who "evaluat[ed] respect for press freedom in a particular country." The index is a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the highest and 100 the lowest level of press freedom. In 2003 it included 166 countries. I also tested models using the Freedom House press-freedom dataset, with similar results.

²⁰Press freedom *does* significantly influence war opposition and troop contributions *in interaction with* the number of parties and media access in ways consistent with the theory. Due to space limitations, I exclude these hypotheses and empirical tests from the present study.

that of military- or policy-oriented coverage by subtracting the average volumes of the former two categories from those of the latter two. (This combined variable produced a Krippendorff's Alpha coefficient of .84, indicating high reliability [Krippendorff 2004].) Second, I compare the overall average level of positiveness in Iraq-related coverage (Krippendorff's Alpha = .68, indicating acceptable reliability [Krippendorff 2004]).²¹ Third, I compare the number of distinct topics included in the coverage as an indicator of the diversity of frames included in news coverage. Because this variable is coded from simple Boolean logic—that is, the objective presence of select keywords—it did not require a human training set.²² (In Table A3 of the supplemental appendix, I report results from additional intercoder reliability tests using Fleiss's Kappa and Kendall's W, as well as overall levels of coder agreement. The results from these latter tests are consistent with those based on Krippendorff's Alpha.)

Beginning with coverage focus, the results of a t-test indicate that, relative to low-ENPP states (those below the mean), high-ENPP states (those above the mean), on average, include more policy/military coverage than personality/human-interest-oriented coverage, by .53 standard deviations on the coverage focus scale ($p < .06$). If we limit this analysis to coverage following the initiation of the conflict on March 20, 2003, the difference expands to .78 standard deviations ($p < .01$). One would presumably anticipate an across-the-board spike in military- and policy-oriented news reporting once the war began. However, the larger effect in the postwar-initiation period indicates that high-ENPP states saw a substantially larger spike in policy and military coverage, relative to personality and human-interest-oriented coverage, than their low-ENPP counterparts. The corresponding differences when I employ ENEP in place of ENPP are .58 and .71 ($p < .05$ in both cases) standard deviations for the full and postconflict-initiation periods, respectively.

Turning to valence, a t-test indicates that low-ENPP states feature more positive war-related coverage than high-ENPP states (by .56 standard deviations on the news valence scale, $p < .05$). The magnitude and significance levels of the valence differences are similar both prior to and following the outbreak of war. The corresponding difference when I employ ENEP in place of ENPP is .67 standard deviations ($p < .05$). It is worth noting

²¹If I remove cases that the coders identified as "tough calls," the Krippendorff's Alpha coefficients rise to .86 and .76 for focus and valence, respectively.

²²Given the difficulty of achieving acceptable intercoder reliability when counting unique frames included in the news, I employ the diversity of substantive topics as a "best available" proxy.

that when I disaggregate the data to individual articles, all of the above-reported differences between news reports originating in low- versus high-party states remain in the predicted directions and are statistically significant at $p < .0001$. (I present these latter results in the supplemental appendix.)

With respect to the diversity of frames, a t-test on the number of topics indicates that, relative to low-ENPP states, news coverage in high-ENPP states includes more distinct topics (suggesting greater diversity of frames) by about .36 standard deviations. This overall difference is not significant ($p < .15$). However, if we limit the comparison to news coverage following the start of the war, the difference expands to .57 standard deviations and becomes significant at $p < .05$. In this instance, employing ENEP in place of ENPP to distinguish low- versus high-party states strengthens the results. The corresponding difference for the full sample is .68 standard deviations ($p < .05$), in the predicted direction, while that for the postconflict-initiation period is .80 standard deviations ($p < .01$), also in the predicted direction.

In all three cases, these results support H_D .²³ Media in states with relatively few parties do appear to offer more positive and less diverse war-related coverage, featuring relatively more personality and human-interest-oriented focus and less military- or policy-oriented focus than their counterparts in states with larger numbers of parties.

Public Opinion and Troop Contribution Hypothesis Tests (H1–H5). My theory predicts that as the number of parties increases, greater public access to the media will be associated with *increased* opposition to the war (H1), while as the number of parties decreases, the relationship will weaken, and ultimately reverse, with greater media access associated with *reduced* public war opposition (H2). Table 1 presents a series of OLS analyses testing both hypotheses. As a robustness test, Models 1–6 in Table 1 omit all control variables, while Models 7–15 present the fully specified models. The results, though not identical, are quite similar, suggesting that the relationships reported below are not artifacts of model specification. Consequently, I proceed more confidently to interpreting the fully specified model.

I test my hypotheses against all three previously described electoral system indicators. Models 4–6 in Table 1 thus employ ENPP, ENEP, and the PR dummy, respectively. For ease of interpretation, I use Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) to calculate the expected values of the dependent variables as the key causal variables vary, with all controls held constant at their mean values.

The top-right graphic in Figure 2 illustrates the expected change in opposition to the Iraq War, as the number of televisions per 1,000 population increases from one standard deviation below, to one standard deviation above the mean among countries with available public opinion data (from 157 to 727 TV's).²⁴ I separately present the results for low- and high-party states, defined as one standard deviation below or above the mean (from 2.36 to 5.58 for ENPP and from 2.94 to 6.66 for ENEP).

In low-ENPP states, an increase in the number of television households from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a nearly 16 percentage point decline in public war opposition (from 71 to 55%, $p < .05$), representing just over a standard deviation decrease. The results are similar for the other two indicators. As TV penetration increases by two standard deviations in low-ENEP nations, public opposition to the war declines by nearly 19 percentage points (from 72 to 53%, $p < .05$), again, just over a standard deviation decline. Finally, war opposition is nearly 17 points lower in non-PR states, relative to PR states (68 vs. 51%, $p < .10$), again representing a decline of about a standard deviation. In short, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, in countries with relatively few political parties, increased access to television is associated with a *decrease* in public opposition to the war in Iraq.

Turning to Hypothesis 1, the top-left graphic in Figure 2 indicates that in high-ENPP states, a two standard deviation increase, centered on the mean, in the number of televisions per 1,000 population is associated with just over a 19-point *increase* in war opposition (from .65 to .84, $p < .01$), representing a 1.24 standard deviation increase. The corresponding increase in TV penetration in high-ENEP nations is associated with just over an 18-point increase in war opposition (from .65 to .83, $p < .05$)—or about 1.15 standard deviations. Finally, in PR states the corresponding effect is a statistically insignificant increase of less than 3 points (from .69 to .72), far smaller than that associated with non-PR states. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, in countries with relatively large numbers of political parties, the positive relationship between TV penetration and opposition to the war observed among low-party states weakens dramatically in one case and reverses in two, with increased access to television associated with *increases* in expected opposition to the Iraq War.

I turn next to my troop contribution models, testing Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. My goal here is to determine the effects of leaders' expectations concerning

²³All reported results replicate when I exclude countries with fewer than three newspapers.


²⁴In the supplemental appendix, I graph the ENPP results for the full range of variation in TV Access.

TABLE 1 OLS Analyses of Effects of Variations in TV Access and Number of Parties on Public Opposition to Iraq War and Troop Commitments

	Troops Deployed (Base Models)			War Opposition (Base Models)			War Opposition			Troops Deployed (Full Models)			Troops Deployed (No War Opposition)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	ENPP	ENEP	PR	ENPP	ENEP	PR	ENPP	ENEP	PR	ENPP	ENEP	PR	ENPP	ENEP	PR
% Oppose War	-.060 (.062)	-.078 (.056)	-.065 (.041)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.006 (.052)	-.019 (.053)	-.036 (.032)	-	-	-
PR/Parties	.065 [^] (.035)	.053 [^] (.030)	.090* (.041)	.029 [^] (.017)	.021 (.013)	.036 [^] (.019)	-.068 (.047)	-.070 (.044)	-.063 (.153)	.49*** (.017)	.050*** (.018)	.167** (.054)	.036* (.016)	.026 [^] (.013)	.050* (.024)
TV Access (x10)	.008* (.004)	.008 [^] (.004)	.004* (.002)	.005 [^] (.003)	.005 [^] (.002)	.002* (.001)	-.011* (.005)	-.013* (.005)	-.005 [^] (.003)	.008*** (.002)	.009*** (.003)	.006*** (.001)	.006*** (.002)	.006*** (.002)	.003* (.001)
Parties x TV	-.002 [^] (.001)	-.001 [^] (.001)	-.004* (.002)	-.001 [^] (.001)	-.001 [^] (.000)	-.002 [^] (.001)	.003* (.001)	.003* (.001)	.006* (.003)	-.002** (.000)	-.002*** (.000)	-.005** (.001)	-.001* (.001)	-.001* (.000)	-.003* (.001)
GDP per capita	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
%ΔGDP	-	-	-	-	-	-	.050 (.462)	-.102 (.443)	.025 (.394)	-.441** (.157)	-.355* (.144)	-.268*** (.092)	-.274* (.110)	-.248 (.104)	-.106* (.053)
Infant Mortality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.003 (.002)	.002* (.001)	.002 [^] (.001)	.002* (.001)	.002 [^] (.001)	.002 [^] (.001)	.001 (.001)
Secondary Enrollment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.003*** (.001)	.003* (.001)	.001 (.001)	.002 [^] (.001)	.002 [^] (.001)	.0003 (.001)
Inflation	-	-	-	-	-	-	.008 [^] (.004)	.008 [^] (.005)	.007 (.006)	-.004* (.002)	-.004 [^] (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.000 (.000)
Democracy	-	-	-	-	-	-	.024 (.033)	.023 (.031)	-.014 (.009)	-.039** (.014)	-.038* (.016)	-.002 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	.000 (.003)	.0017 [^] (.001)
NATO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.058 (.102)	-.058 (.101)	-.083 (.105)	.080*** (.027)	.076* (.029)	.057* (.025)	.055* (.023)	.060* (.025)	.066* (.028)
U.S. Ally	-	-	-	-	-	-	.077 (.093)	.060 (-.092)	.055 (.083)	-.078* (.029)	-.066* (.029)	-.053* (.022)	-.0454* (.023)	-.043 [^] (.022)	-.029 [^] (.017)
Constant	-.327* (.154)	-.323 [^] (.163)	-.119** (.043)	-.124 [^] (.072)	-.111 [^] (.067)	-.036 [^] (.019)	-.160 (.370)	-.055 (.371)	-.286 (.221)	-.098 (.117)	-.170 (.131)	-.213* (.097)	-.252 [^] (.132)	-.270 [^] (.146)	-.09 (.067)
Observations	51	51	62	102	98	172	50	50	59	50	50	59	80	80	125
R-squared	.51	.47	.58	.33	.28	.32	.35	.35	.25	.76	.73	.73	.58	.54	.49

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, [^]p < 0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

FIGURE 2 Expected Change in Public Opposition and Troop Contributions to “Coalition of the Willing” as TV Access Increases by Two Standard Deviations, Low- vs. High-Party States



the longer-term implications of public opinion, as distinct from contemporaneous support. Consequently, I include the log of public opposition as a control variable. Hypothesis 3 predicts that increased numbers of parties will be associated with a stronger negative relationship between TV household penetration and participation in the Coalition, while Hypothesis 4 predicts that this relationship will weaken or reverse as the number of parties declines. Models 10–12 in Table 1 test these hypotheses.

In the bottom-left graphic in Figure 2, I illustrate the results of my tests of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. The results indicate that in low-ENPP and low-ENEP states, an increase in the number of TV households (again, from 157 to 727) is associated with increases of .213 ($p < .01$) and .24 ($p < .01$) troops per capita, respectively, representing increases of about 2 and 2.2 standard deviations, respectively. Finally, in non-PR states, the corresponding effect is an increase of .318 troops per capita ($p < .01$), representing an increase of nearly 3 standard deviations. In other words, as anticipated by Hypothesis 4, in countries with relatively few political parties, increased access to television is associated with *increased* troop contributions to the Coalition.

The results for my test of Hypothesis 3 indicate that in high-ENPP and high-ENEP states, the same increase in the number of television households is associated with *declines* of .10 ($p < .05$) and .09 ($p < .10$) troops per capita contributed to the Coalition, representing declines of just over .9 and .82 standard deviations, respectively. Finally, in PR states, the corresponding effect is an increase of .03 troops per capita ($p < .01$), again a far smaller increase than that associated with non-PR states. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, in countries with relatively large numbers of parties, the relationship between TV penetration and troop commitments to the Coalition weakens in one case and reverses in two, with increased access to television associated with *declines* in the expected contribution to the Coalition.

One of the primary limitations in the analysis thus far is the limited number of available observations—ranging from 50 to 59 in my models. Hence, as a robustness test, Models 13–15 in Table 1 replicate Models 10–12, excluding war opposition, which is insignificant in every model. This makes sense, given that *anticipated* longer-term opinion is likely to trump contemporaneous *actual* opinion in influencing leaders (especially in

low-party states, where contemporaneous opinion is a relatively poor indicator of longer-term opinion). Excluding this variable increases the N's to 80 in my ENPP and ENEP models and 129 in my PR model. In the bottom-left graphic in Figure 2, I again employ Clarify to facilitate an intuitive illustration of the results.

The results once again confirm my expectations. Comparing the bottom-left and bottom-right graphics in Figure 2, we see quite similar patterns. The only noteworthy distinction is that, presumably due to the greater number of noncoalition participants included in the models, many of the differences are modestly smaller than those shown in the top-right graphic in Figure 2. This increases my confidence in the reliability of the results reported above.

My final hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) predicts that as the number of parties rises, a given increase in media access will be associated with a stronger inverse relationship between public opposition to the Iraq War and the propensity to join the Coalition. Models 1–3 of Table 2 test this prediction by interacting the number of parties with TV access and logged public opposition to the war, replicating the model for all three party-system indicators.²⁵ In Table 3, in turn, I present the expected number of troops contributed to the Coalition as TV access, the number of parties, and opposition to the war vary.

The results in Table 3 indicate that, as predicted, in high-party states public opposition to the war appears to inhibit leaders from joining the Coalition to a greater extent when TV access is high than when it is low. This effect weakens, and even reverses, in low-party states.

The top section of Table 3 presents the results for the ENPP model. With minimum war opposition, as TV access increases in low-ENPP states, the expected number of troops contributed to the Coalition increases by about .31 troops per capita ($p < .01$). The corresponding increase given maximum war opposition is a little less than .16 troops per capita ($p < .05$). Hence, the predicted difference in the increases in contributions given variations in war opposition for low- versus high-TV access states is .15 troops per capita ($p < .05$). This suggests that when the number of parties is low—which I argue is associated with more compliant media coverage than multiparty systems—leaders will view enhanced public access to the media as an opportunity to gain greater public support over the longer term. While opposition to the war has some constraining effect, it is relatively muted. If a leader discounts contemporaneous public opinion, then even

intense public opposition is unlikely to fully deter her from her preferred policies.

Table 3 also indicates that in high-ENPP states, increased TV access, given minimum war opposition, is associated with an .18 increase in troops per capita contributed ($p < .01$). Conversely, given maximum war opposition, the corresponding effect is an .18 decrease in troops per capita (insignificant). This .36 difference is significant at $p < .05$. Increased media access can thus cut either way. This suggests that because media coverage in multiparty states is likely to be more policy centric, contemporaneous public opposition or support likely represents a relatively more reliable indicator of the longer-term political implications of a policy. Consequently, leaders are *more* constrained by public opposition. These results offer clear support for Hypothesis 5.

Finally, the difference between the differential effects of enhanced TV access given minimum versus maximum war opposition is over twice as large in high- relative to low-ENPP states (.354 vs. .149). This .21 troops per capita difference in the differences between low- and high-ENPP states ($p < .05$) is equivalent to nearly two standard deviations. The corresponding relationships for the ENEP and PR models are strikingly similar, and so I do not review them in detail, but instead refer interested readers to Table 3.

According to the Downsian Hypothesis (H_D), the number of parties should influence the nature of political news coverage. I argue that the resulting tenor of news coverage influences public opinion and foreign policy decision making, albeit through partially distinct paths and to varying degrees depending on the party system. This implies that the party system helps predict the likely nature of news coverage, which in turn influences public opinion and decision making. In fact, ENPP and news valence correlate at $-.26$ overall, and $-.43$ for countries above the mean level of TV access among democracies. The corresponding correlations with ENEP are $-.43$ and $-.59$, respectively. These correlations indicate—consistent with H_D —that as the number of parties rises, news coverage becomes less positive.

Robustness Checks. I do not have news valence data for enough countries to replicate my full model specifications. However, I can interact news valence with TV Access in place of the number of parties in models with a reduced set of controls. The results for the troop commitment models (Models 6–7 of Table 2) largely replicate the previous results, thereby enhancing my confidence in their validity. Controlling for secondary enrollment (or infant mortality, as shown in Models 3 and 6 in supplemental online appendix Table A6) and GDP per capita (Model 6 in Table 2), and given minimum positive Iraq

²⁵Note that Model 3 in Table 2 excludes the largest residual outlier, Canada, the inclusion of which modestly weakens the reported results.

TABLE 2 Effects of Variations in TV Access, Number of Parties, and News Valence on Public Opposition to the Iraq War and Troop Commitments

	Model 1 ENPP	Model 2 ENEP	Model 3 PR	Model 4 IV Regression (War Opposition)	Model 5 IV Regression (Troops)	Model 6 News Valence I (Troops)	Model 7 News Valence II (Troops)
% Oppose War	-.0042 (.1676)	-.0521 (.1750)	-.0542 (.0747)	-	-.211* (.109)	-	-.060 (.172)
PR/Parties	.0605** (.0170)	.0610** (.0183)	.2283*** (.0523)	-.069 ^ (.047)	.038 ^ (.020)	-	-
TV Access	.0007** (.0002)	.0007** (.0003)	.0006*** (.0001)	-.009* (.004)	.0058* (.0025)	-.002* (.001)	-.0019 ^ (.0010)
Parties x TV Access	-.0002** (.0001)	-.0002** (.0001)	-.0006*** (.0002)	.0023* (.0009)	-.0012* (.0006)	-	-
Parties x Oppose War	.0463 (.0370)	.0574 ^ (.0308)	.1823 ^ (.0913)	-	-	-	-
Parties x TV x Oppose War	-.0001* (.0000)	-.0001 ^ (.0000)	-.0003 ^ (.0001)	-	-	-	-
GDP per capita	.0000 (.0000)	-.0000 (.0000)	-.0000 (.0000)	-	-	-.000004* (.000002)	-.000005 (.000003)
%ΔGDP	-.3984* (.1622)	-.3107* (.1521)	-.2496* (.1007)	-.452 (.451)	-.396* (.184)	-	-
Infant Mortality	.0019 ^ (.0009)	.0020* (.0009)	.0022* (.0009)	-.001 (.002)	.002 ^ (.001)	-	-
Secondary Enrollment	.0028* (.0012)	.0026 ^ (.0013)	.0005 (.0007)	-.003 (.002)	.003* (.001)	.000 (.001)	.0006 (.0015)
Democracy	-.0354* (.0147)	-.0335* (.0155)	-.0017 (.0032)	.027 (.032)	-.031** (.012)	-	-
Inflation	-.0046* (.0019)	-.0047* (.0021)	-.0021 (.0014)	.004 (.006)	-	-	-
NATO	.0795** (.0276)	.0770* (.0297)	.0724** (.0263)	.002 (.101)	.065* (.033)	-	-
U.S. Ally	-.0648* (.0292)	-.0518 ^ (.0290)	-.0413 ^ (.0210)	.005 (.086)	-.049 ^ (.028)	-	-
Majority Muslim	-	-	-	.167 (.117)	-	-	-
Trade with U.S. (x1000)	-	-	-	-.0005* (.0002)	-.0003* (.0001)	-	-
Energy Consumption(x1000)	-	-	-	.0003 ^ (.0002)	-	-	-
News Valence	-	-	-	-	-	-9.937* (4.855)	-10.091 ^ (5.546)
TV Access x News Valence (x100)	-	-	-	-	-	.037* (.015)	.036* (.017)
Constant	-.0837 (.1213)	-.1356 (.1211)	-.2074* (.0890)	-.080 (.383)	-.180 (.129)	.573 (.346)	.500 (.407)
R-squared (N)	.78(50)	.76(50)	.81(58)	.32(49)	.54(49)	.60(34)	.64(26)

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

news valence, an increase in TV access from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a drop of .316 troops per capita ($p < .05$). Conversely, the corresponding increase in TV access given maximum net positive news valence is a .325 increase in troops per capita ($p < .01$). Though

derived from a model with only 35 observations, these results are consistent with H₃ and H₄ and hence bolster my confidence in the previously reported results employing party-system indicators as predictors of media content. Controlling for public war opposition (Model 7 in Table 2) reduces the N to 26, but does not materially change the

TABLE 3 Effects of Variations in War Opposition, TV Access, and Number of Parties on Number of Troops Contributed to the Coalition of the Willing

	Minimum War Opposition	Maximum War Opposition	Difference (Low vs. High TV Access)	Difference (in Diff. between Low vs. High TV Effects, Low vs. High Parties)
ENPP Low				
Low TV Access	-0.098	-0.012	-0.086	
High TV Access	0.208	0.145	<u>0.063</u>	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.306**</i>	<i>0.157*</i>	<i>0.149*</i>	
ENPP High				
Low TV Access	-0.121	0.087	-0.208	
High TV Access	0.057	-0.089	<u>0.146</u>	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.178**</i>	<i>-0.176</i>	<i>0.354*</i>	.21* (.354-.149)
ENEP Low				
Low TV Access	-0.106	-0.021	-0.085	
High TV Access	0.237	0.135	<u>0.102</u>	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.343**</i>	<i>0.156**</i>	<i>0.187*</i>	
ENEP High				
Low TV Access	-0.166	0.102	-0.268	
High TV Access	0.078	-0.078	<u>0.156</u>	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.244^</i>	<i>-0.18**</i>	<i>0.424*</i>	.24* (.424-.187)
NOT PR				
Low TV Access	-0.019	-0.083	0.064	
High TV Access	0.317	0.252	0.065	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.336**</i>	<i>0.335**</i>	<i>0.001</i>	
PR				
Low TV Access	-0.06	0.038	-0.098	
High TV Access	0.101	0.013	<u>0.088</u>	
<i>Difference</i>	<i>0.161*</i>	<i>-0.025</i>	<i>0.186*</i>	.18* (.186-.001)

^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.

results. (Table A5 in the supplemental appendix presents a more complete set of analyses, including models employing war opposition as dependent variable. It also presents further conceptual explication of the news valence indicator, both in general and as applied to these analyses.)

Thus far, my analyses have treated the effects of media access and party systems on public attitudes toward the war in Iraq and states' decisions to send troops to join the Coalition as independent from one another. However, as my theory and evidence suggest, to the extent that public attitudes can influence troop contribution decisions, while media access and party systems influence *both* public attitudes and troop contributions, it is possible that media access and party systems also influence troop-contribution decisions indirectly *through* their direct influence on public attitudes. This suggests a recursive relationship, whereby media access and party systems directly influence both public opinion and troop contributions, and public opinion directly influences con-

tributions, but there is no hypothesized feedback loop from troop contributions to public opinion.²⁶ I thus employ recursive regression to test whether this indirect path is statistically and substantively significant, using the delta method to derive confidence intervals surrounding the predicted indirect effects on troop contributions, via public opinion, of media access and party systems. (See Baum and Lake 2003 for an explication of recursive regression analysis and the delta method.) Given my limited statistical leverage, I employ this approach solely as a supplemental test intended to bolster the OLS results.

Models 4 and 5 in Table 2 present the results of an instrumental variable regression, which forms the basis for the recursive regression approach. In order to properly

²⁶As noted, public attitudes solidified in most countries prior to the outbreak of war. Moreover, most surveys employed herein took place either prior to or roughly in parallel with troop-contribution decisions. This further reduces the likelihood that the latter caused the former.

identify an instrument for public war opposition, I added several causal variables to the recursive system, including a dummy for majority Muslim countries, the total volume of trade between each country and the United States, and the total amount of energy consumed by each country. Each *directly* influences attitudes to a much greater extent than troop commitments (net of the other factors included in the models).

The results support the hypothesized indirect path of influence for media access and party systems, as well as Hypotheses 1–4. Given the minimum number of parties (measured via ENPP), a near-maximum increase in TVs per 1,000 households (from 1 to 1,500) directly yields an increase in per capita troop commitments of .684 ($p < .05$). However, there also emerges a substantial indirect effect through public war opposition. The corresponding indirect effect is an increase of .215 troops per capita ($p < .05$), representing nearly one-quarter of the total combined effect of increases in TV access on troop commitments.

Given the maximum number of parties, the relationships reverse, as in the OLS analyses. In this case, a maximum increase in TV access is associated with a *decrease* in troop contributions of about .75 troops per capita ($p < .05$). The corresponding indirect effect in this case is a decrease of .38 troops per capita ($p < .05$), representing about one-third of the total combined effect of TV access on troop contributions. Due to the small *N*s in the recursive regression models, these results should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, they do appear consistent with my OLS findings, offering additional support for Hypotheses 1–4.

Taken together, my findings strongly suggest that media access is an important intervening variable between citizens and leaders. The aforementioned alternative explanation—that greater representativeness of consensual relative to majoritarian democracies accounts for any differences across party systems in the relationship between public opinion and troop contributions—cannot account for the observed effects of TV access, holding the number of parties constant. Nor can it account for either the reversal in the valence of those effects in low- vs. high-party states or the differential effects of news valence on troop commitments as media access varies.

Conclusion

The relative disinterest among international relations scholars regarding the role of the mass media in reducing or enhancing international conflict is unsurprising, given the literature's disproportionate emphasis on systemic-level variables, deriving from the dominance

of the realist approach to understanding international politics. Yet recent theories regarding the mechanisms through which domestic political factors influence states' international behavior strongly suggest a need to correct this oversight. Rationalist theories of war hold that information failure is a primary cause of interstate conflict, while democratic peace theorists argue that the accountability of democratic leaders to their electorates allows them to peacefully resolve international disputes by, for instance, generating domestic-audience costs (Fearon 1994).

Both perspectives emphasize the role of information transparency in mitigating international conflict. Yet for information to be transparent, it must first be transmitted. And the primary mechanisms for doing so are the mass media. Evidence from the Iraq case suggests that the media do influence states' conflict behavior in differing ways and to varying degrees, depending in part on the institutional environment in which they operate. In multiparty states, increased public access to television reduced both support for the war and the propensity to commit troops to the Coalition. In contrast, in two-party states, greater media access is associated with *lower* opposition to the war and *higher* troop commitments, but a weaker link between the two. This, again, is consistent with the Downsian view that multiparty systems promote policy-centric media coverage of politics, which, in turn, empowers citizens to more effectively monitor their leaders' activities.

Because citizens in multiparty democracies are more likely to encounter information conflicting with the leaders' preferred framing of a foreign conflict, they are more likely to punish leaders who engage in risky foreign adventures and fail. Consequently, media coverage in most instances weighs more heavily on leaders' political calculations in multiparty than in two-party states. Variations in press freedom are insufficient to account for these patterns.

My evidence thus clearly suggests a need to more fully integrate some aspects of political communication scholarship with research on the domestic sources of foreign policy and on international conflict. Doing so will allow scholars to develop a more nuanced understanding of the effects of information transparency on states' international-conflict behavior. One potentially fruitful avenue for such research concerns the theory of domestic-audience costs. With few exceptions, the empirical evidence that domestic-audience costs influence foreign policy outcomes is considerably weaker than the impressive array of theoretical models suggesting that such costs "should" matter (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012). My findings offer one possible explanation for this discrepancy. That is, audience-cost theories that do

not take into account the potentially multidirectional influences of information on public opinion are underspecified. In some cases media coverage and public opinion will constrain leaders; in others it will embolden them. Failing to disentangle the circumstances under which one or the other pattern is likely to emerge may cause the two patterns to, in effect, cancel each other out empirically, leading scholars to wrongly conclude that there is no audience-cost effect (a Type II error).

These multidirectional patterns also hold implications for democratic peace theory. Domestic audience-cost research has focused on their supposed pacifying effect as a contributor to the democratic peace. My findings suggest that such a contribution is highly contingent and that in many cases we may see the opposing pattern, with public scrutiny (due to media coverage) facilitating *more*, rather than less, conflict. Fearon's (1994) seminal work on audience costs anticipated that such costs could make war more likely, if states reached a point where the costs of backing down exceeded the costs of war. My findings suggest a mechanism through which this countervailing pattern is relatively more or less likely to occur (see also Potter and Baum 2010).

In an era of rapidly expanding and diversifying media, the potential for media to influence foreign policy via its effects on citizen awareness of and attitudes regarding the activities of their leaders is also increasing. Consequently, access to and the content of information transmitted via the media should be assessed alongside traditional realist variables in scholarly efforts to account for patterns of international conflict and cooperation.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

- **Table A1:** Iraq War Survey Questions AND Participating Countries
- Press Coverage Content Analysis Data
 - Selection
- **Table A2:** Iraq Data Summary
 - Variable Definitions
 - Case Identifier Variables
 - **Topic Variables**
- Coverage and Valence Variables**
- **Table A3:** Intercoder reliability, all variables
- **Table A4:** Summary statistics for Iraq variables
- Content Analysis Robustness Check
- **Table A5**
 - **Sources**
- Additional Robustness Tests
- **Table A6:** OLS Analyses of Effects of News Valence, TV Access, and Expected Number of Parliamentary Parties on War
- **Table A7:** OLS Robustness Tests of Troop Commitment Models Excluding Post-War Initiation Opinion Cases, U.S., and U.K. Cases
- **Figure A1:** Expected public opposition and troop contributions to "Coalition of the Willing" as TV Access Increases from Minimum to Maximum Levels, High vs. Low ENPP